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Afghanistan Insurgency & Groups Introduction: Insurgency has existed as long as the powerful have frustrated the weak to the point of violence. It is simply a strategy of desperation in which those with no other options turn to protracted, asymmetric violence, psychological warfare, and political mobilization. In some modes, insurgents seek to attain their objectives directly by wearing down the dominant power. In other forms, particularly the one developed by
Mao Zedong and refined by his disciples, asymmetric methods are used to rectify an adverse conventional military balance, with ultimate victory coming through conventional means once parity or something like it is attained. Ultimately, though, the result is the same: the weak avoid defeat and, over time, the power balance changes and they become stronger. Determinants of Success: During the past century some insurgencies attained victory or success. Many more have failed. Those which did succeed invariably exhibited one characteristic: they were able to prevent the counterinsurgents, whether the regime or outside occupiers, from driving the conflict to the point of decision in the military realm while the counterinsurgents still had an overwhelming military superiority. At a somewhat finer level of resolution, successful insurgencies had four characteristics in common: Effective strategy: Insurgent strategies have two interlinked dimensions: they must avoid a decisive engagement until the adverse power balance is adjusted, and they must take direct steps to adjust the power balance by weakening the counterinsurgents and strengthening the insurgents themselves. Often
insurgents have been able to build strategies in which they seize and hold the initiative due to their inherently greater flexibility and absence of ethical or legal constraints. Effective ideology: There are many variants of effective insurgent ideologies, but are unifying and mobilizing. In the 20th century, the combination of Marxism and nationalism was particularly powerful. The nationalistic angle made the ideology broad and unifying; the Marxist angle focused anger and resentment on the regime and provided a rationale for why the insurgents could expect ultimate success even when the odds against them appeared long. Effective leadership: Leading an insurgency is extremely difficult. Insurgent leaders must convince people to undertake extraordinary danger and hardship for extended periods of time with a very small chance of a positive outcome. Those who succeed tend to be those who can unify diverse groups and organizations and mobilize segments of the polity not previously engaged in politics. Psychologically, effective insurgent leaders tend to be so dedicated to their cause that they will persevere even though the odds are greatly stacked against them. In a similar vein, they tend
to believe so strongly in their cause that they become utterly ruthless, and are willing to take whatever steps are necessary to weaken the counterinsurgents. Insurgent leadership, in other words, is not a business for the faint of heart, but for the utterly committed. A method of obtaining resources: In the broadest terms, insurgents need five types of resources: 1) manpower; 2) funding; 3) equipment/supplies; 4) sanctuary; and, 5) intelligence. These can be provided, seized, or created. Provided resources can come from outside sponsors, domestic supporters, or from the ineptitude of the counterinsurgents (e.g., the government may provide sanctuary by being unaware of the presence of the insurgents). Funding, equipment, and supplies are the resources most often seized, but in some insurgencies, particularly those in Africa, manpower is seized through violence as insurgents undertake forcible recruitment. Just as in nature an organism seeks to obtain food with the minimum energy expenditure, most insurgencies would prefer to be provided resources, but will seize or create them if none are provided or, in some cases, if provided resources come with too many strings attached. Insurgency in Afghanistan: Overview: The ongoing insurgency is a mixture of that nation's traditional, persistent low level conflict between various groups and powerful figures, and the global insurgency centered on radical Islam. In a sense, Afghanistan represents a continuation of lawlessness, more than open conflict, with various militant groups vying for power. Sometimes acting in concert but often in isolation, these insurgent groups exert a presence that is growing in light of the upcoming national elections in September. At the same time, the jihadists, led by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda, remain determined to see that Afghanistan is a battlefield in their global struggle with the United States. To the extent there is coherence to the strategy and the ideology of the Afghan insurgency, it is derived from this linkage to the global insurgency.
Brief History of Modern Afghanistan: The last three decades, Afghanistan has been in almost constant conflict. After securing independence from British rule in 1919, Afghanistan enjoyed a period of stability from 1933 to 1973 under the kingship of Mohamed Zahir Shah.
In 1973, Zahir was deposed by his cousin, who, only five years later, was himself overthrown by Afghan communists. The United States began secretly funding and training anti-communist Mujahideen forces - Muslims who opposed the communists' atheism. Iran and Saudi Arabia also supported the Mujahideen. In 1979, the Soviet Union intervened, engaging in a conflict with the Mujahideen that led to the mass exodus of 5 million Afghan refugees. By the time Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, they had lost 15,000 troops.
The country fell under the divided control of various Mujahideen warlords. In 1996, with the backing of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and others, the Taliban seized power and imposed an extreme interpretation of Sharia. The Taliban provided transnational terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, safe haven for training and preparation for terrorist attacks. Osama Bin Laden, who had fought against Soviet Forces in Afghanistan the 1980s, returned in 1996.
In the October following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States launched "Operation Enduring Freedom," quickly overthrowing the Taliban regime and installing Hamid Karzai as interim president. In 2004, Afghanistan held presidential elections and Karzai was elected with a strong majority.
Main Insurgent Groups in Afghanistan: The insurgent groups can be grouped into three main categories:
Eastern Afghanistan It falls under the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbedin (HIG). HIG operates mainly in the provinces of the Ningarhar, Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan. The group has been aided by some Al Qaeda operatives mainly in the Kunar and Nuristan regions. However HIG suffers from problem of funding, recruitment and desertion. Some higher HIG leadership has joined the political process while some were inducted into government posts.
Southeastern Afghanistan It comprising the provinces of Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Kabul, Ghazni and Logar provinces are under the influence of Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda leaning Taliban under the Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani. The Al Qaeda operatives / militants are mainly Arabs, Uzbek and Chechens.
Southern Afghanistan The Kandahari Taliban hold sway in the provinces of the Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand and Zabul provinces.
Political analysts identify 2004 as a pivotal year for the Islamic militant insurgency in Afghanistan. Between the time of the Taliban’s ouster in late 2001 and 2004, militant bands tended to stage small-scale hit-and-run raids. Since then, however, militant operations have become increasingly complex and their ability to project influence has expanded.
A Khost-based analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that militants were offering substantial bounties to people or groups that killed or kidnapped foreigners or government officials. The increasing effectiveness of militant operations has played a significant role in intimidating Afghans in southern provinces. "This [intimidation] has resulted in a drop-out rate of approximately 50 percent among ANA [Afghanistan National Army] recruits in the region," the analyst said. "Soldiers are afraid of the bounties being offered, and [they believe] their salary does not compensate the risks."
Farmers in rural Khost Province report that a bounty of roughly 15,000 Pakistani rupees (about $250) is offered for the assassination of Afghan government officials, or civilians working with the US Army. A bounty of up to 100,000 Pakistani rupees (approximately $1,700) is offered for the killing of a foreigner, whether soldier or civilian.
Grades of insurgency in Afghanistan: The insurgency can be divided into two main tiers. The top tier is made up of the Taliban leadership structure and key commanders, including former Afghan leader Mullah Omar, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and several hundred other military and political commanders. These men are motivated by radical Islam, and see the insurgency as a fight with Western infidels, and the West's "puppet government" in Kabul.
The bottom tier includes thousands of local fighters and their support network. These are primarily young men from rural villages who are paid to set up roadside bombs, launch rockets and mortars at NATO and Afghan forces, or pick up a gun for a few days. Most are not ideologically committed to jihad. Rather, they are motivated because they are unemployed, disenchanted with the lack of change since 2001, or angry because a local villager was killed or wounded by Afghan, U.S. or NATO forces.
Counterinsurgency Strategies: A successful counterinsurgency strategy must separate these two tiers.
Dealing with the top tier requires a Machiavellian approach. Members of this group cannot be converted. They must be captured or killed because of their ideological commitment to jihad.
The bottom tier is equally critical. Separating the bottom from the top tier will require fighting for the hearts and souls of local villagers in the south and east by addressing their key concerns. Reconstruction and development need to reach rural areas threatened by the Taliban to capture the allegiance of the bottom tier.
Separating the insurgency's two tiers is possible. But it requires an understanding of the primacy of local politics. And it means convincing villagers in the south and east that the local and national governments have more to offer than the Taliban.
Current Situation in Afghanistan: The security situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating in recent months as US-led forces have failed to quell the ongoing insurgency in the southern and eastern regions of the country. Terrorists had increased attacks against civilians, schools, religious figures, security forces and international partners. They had also broadened the scope of their activities in the region. New violent fronts had been opened.
Challenges to Security & Stability in Afghanistan: • Opium production in Afghanistan has soared since the U.S.-led invasion. Afghanistan now produces 87% of the world's opium. Opium production and illicit opium trafficking are helping to fuel the insurgency.
• Afghan democracy faces a fundamental contradiction. In order to be representative of Afghanistan as a whole, the government would need to involve the participation of groups with illiberal cultural practices, particularly with respect to women. (See: Senate Majority Leader Bill First’s suggestion that the Taliban join the Afghan government)
• Difficult terrain, an almost nonexistent infrastructure, and what may be the largest collection of deployed land mines in the world (a legacy of the Soviet war) have made it difficult for the government's to extend its political authority beyond Kabul.
• The failure of the foreign troops to win over the hearts and minds of the general population and the fact that locals suffered causalities what is termed as “collateral damage” have provided the Taliban support in some areas of the south and southwest of Afghanistan. This has complicated matters.
• High handedness during operations results in the innocent being victims. This is not how counter insurgency operations are conducted. The general population must be won over through trust and care. A careful analysis of the operations conducted show sweeps by foreign and local troops and then their disappearance into fortified positions far away. Troops must stay back in areas cleared so as to prevent harassment of the locals by the insurgents. This is not happening because of low troops levels.
Implications: The outcome of the insurgency in Afghanistan and long-term survival of a stable, peaceful regime are crucial for global security for several reasons:
• Instability, poor infrastructure, a major power vacuum and politically powerful Islamist groups - the elements which, after the Soviet war, made Afghanistan such an ideal place from which to stage jihad - have not been fully addressed. The survival of a moderate regime that is able to broadcast power over the whole of Afghanistan is crucial for preventing a resurgence of Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups
• The international opium trade can have far-reaching, destabilizing for Afghanistan and for the region. Conclusion: An integrated programme to initiate development is imperative. A window of opportunity available in 2002 onwards has been lost. Currently only damage control is possible. The Afghan population patience is wearing thin. They resent foreign troops presence on their soil. They probably give 3-4 years to occupation to see peace, a corruption free government and development. There is a perception in at least a large segment of the population that nothing is being done. This will lead to unpredictable consequences and may result in destabilization of the entire region.
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