FASIC - Forum for Area Studies and Information Center

Afghanistan had remained a backward country and continued to remain so till the middle of the 20th century. It lacked infrastructure, health facilities, educational institutions and land communication. After 1950 both the Soviet Union and the United States provided funds for development activities. The United States reduced its funding by the late 60’s while the Soviets provided much more aid and continued to do so till the end of the 80’s.
After the fall of the PDPA government in April 1992 a civil war followed which led to the destruction of Afghanistan. The destruction was almost complete and nothing much left.
After the US invasion in November 2001 and the occupation of Afghanistan a reconstruction plan was considered. The Tokyo conference 21- 22 January 2002, 5 billion dollars for 6 years was committed by the donor countries. It was followed by the Berlin Conference in which donors agreed to fund the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
However despite the promises the reconstruction has moved at a very slow pace and there is no perceptible or tangible change in the life of an average Afghan.

Afghanistan has a three pronged development strategy. Funds are provided directly the Afghan government to undertake project through its Development Ministry, then there are Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which work under the military commands of NATO and local/foreign NGOs that undertake projects on their own.

Despite 7 years of occupation there is not much visible on ground which would positively affect the life of an average Afghan. While some roads have been reconstructed or rehabilitated and major cities witnessing a construction boom, Afghanistan generally still remains hugely backward. For education and health facilities Afghans have to travel to neighboring countries especially Pakistan. The refugees are also reluctant to return home because of lack of housing, health, education facilities and employment. Industrial growth is almost non existent.

Increasing insecurity and criminality is jeopardizing progress in Afghanistan. With low government revenues, international assistance constitutes around 90% of all public expenditure in the country, thus how it is spent, has an enormous impact on the lives of almost all Afghans and will determine the success of reconstruction and development. Given the links between development and security, the effectiveness of aid also has a major impact on peace and stability in the country. Yet thus far aid has been insufficient and in many cases wasteful or ineffective. There is therefore no time to lose: donors must take urgent steps to increase and improve their assistance to Afghanistan.

Reconstruction assistance is a fraction of military spending. Since 2001 the United States has appropriated $127 billion for the war in Afghanistan and the US military is currently spending nearly $100 million a day in the country, some $36 billion a year. Yet the average volume of international aid provided by all donors since 2001 is woefully inadequate at just $7 million per day. This paucity of aid is reflected in comparative aid per capita figures. In the two years following international intervention, Afghanistan received $57 per capita, whilst Bosnia and East Timor received $679 and $233 per capita respectively.

Since 2001 some $25 billion has been spent on security-related assistance to Afghanistan, such as building Afghan security forces. Donors have committed to spend the same amount on reconstruction and development, yet some leading donors have failed to fulfill little more than half of their aid commitments. Thus, there is an aid shortfall of some $10 billion – equivalent to thirty times the annual national education budget. Just $15 billion in aid has so far been spent, of which it is estimated a staggering 40% has returned to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries.

Funds of up to 10 billion dollars have been injected into the country in the last 6-7 years. However most have been lost due to rampant corruption and lack of institutions to absorb funds. Moreover NGO’s and UN seem to squander funds on personnel comforts and perks leaving little for development. The most disappointing performance has been the PRTs. It was thought that the military with advantage of centralized control, security and its spread across Afghanistan they would be the major source of reconstruction. They have not undertaken any major projects having no impact on everyday life.

Although a number of donors have major projects underway, according to Afghan government figures, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and India have disbursed only a third of their commitments for 2002-2008. The US has to date disbursed only half of its $10.4 billion commitment for this period; and the WB just over half its $1.6 billion commitment. The EC and Germany have disbursed less than two thirds of their respective commitments of $1.7 billion and $1.2 billion. These shortfalls are partly attributable
to challenging operating conditions, high levels of corruption and weak absorption capacities – and government data may not capture all donor spending. However, the magnitude of the shortfalls underscores the importance of donors increasing efforts to mitigate or adapt to such problems, to factor them in to programme planning, and to improve the flow of information to the Afghan government.

Separately, a number of donors are not on track to fulfill their aid pledges for 2002-2011. Overall, $39 billion has been pledged up to 2011; but, thus far, less than 40% of that amount has been spent. According to Afghan government figures, Spain has disbursed only 10% of the aid it has pledged for 2002- 2011, and the US and India have disbursed only 22% of their respective pledges of $22.8 billion and $940 million. Turkey, China, the ADB and WB and Saudi Arabia have all so far delivered less than 40% of their aid pledges for this period. Details Annex A.

As indicated above, a significant proportion of international aid to the south and south-east is delivered through PRTs, of which there are 25 led by 13 different nations. The mandate of PRTs is clear: to ‘assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable security sector reform and reconstruction efforts’. The PRT Handbook also states that each PRT is an ‘interim structure’, which, on fulfillment of its mission, should be dismantled.

PRTs have gone well beyond their interim, security-focused mandate, engaging in development work of variable quality and impact. Although arguably necessary in some highly insecure areas, by diverting resources which otherwise could have been devoted to civilian development activities, PRTs have in many cases undermined the emergence of effective institutions of national and local government, and other civil development processes. PRTs have also contributed to a blurring of the distinction between the military and aid agencies, which has thus undermined the perceived neutrality of the latter, increasing the risk for aid workers, and reduced humanitarian operating space and access.

• There is an aid shortfall of $10bn – equivalent to thirty times the annual national education budget: donors committed to give $25bn aid since 2001 but have only delivered $15bn.
• An estimated 40% of aid goes back to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries – some 6bn since 2001.
• Largely due to lack of coordination and communication, the Afghan government does not know how one-third of all aid since 2001 – some $5bn – has been spent.
• The US military spends close to $100m a day in Afghanistan; yet the average volume of aid spent by all donors since 2001 is just $7m per day.
• Over half of aid is tied, requiring the procurement of donor-country goods and services.
• Over two-thirds of all aid bypasses the Afghan government.
• According to the latest OECD figures less than 40% of technical assistance is coordinated with the government and only one-third of donor analytical or assessment work is conducted jointly.
• Profit margins on reconstruction contracts for international and Afghan contractor companies are often 20% and can be as high as 50%.
• Most full time, expatriate consultants, working in private consulting companies, cost $250,000– $500,000 a year.

• Repaired vital roads, including the Kabul-Kandahar highway and 1,300 km of secondary roads.
• Provided 25 million school textbooks.
• Built/reconstructed 203 schools.
• Rehabilitated 140 health clinics.
• Repaired electrical power plants, including initial rehabilitation of the Kandahar-Kajaki Dam.
• Initiated the construction process on the Pyanj Bridge linking Afghanistan to Tajikistan.
• Repaired and reopened the Salang Tunnel, linking the countries’Southern and northern provinces.
• Supported registration of 1.4 million Afghans for national elections.
• Completed 7,000 small-scale irrigation projects.
• By the end of 2007, 6.4 million children were now in school, including 1.5 million girls. This is the highest number ever in the history of Afghanistan. In Kabul alone, there are five universities, comprising 14 faculties and 10,000 students. There were only about 900,000 children attending schools five years ago, and no girls, for whom education was illegal. Construction work of 1,816 schools commenced in 2007.
• Since 2002, 16 million vaccinations against childhood diseases have been administered, contributing to a 26% decline in infant mortality in the last five years.
• Today, the construction of the ring road is 100% complete in RC (E) and 73% of the Ring Road is paved around the country.
• Real GDP growth is expected to exceed 13% in the current fiscal year ending on March 19, 2008
• Afghan GDP has doubled since 2003 to amount to USD 10 billion this year.

The following are recommended:
• There are a needs for a comprehensive and objective assessment of the reconstruction, development and humanitarian needs of Afghanistan’s provinces, and a corresponding reconfiguration of government and donor spending.
• Construction of roads especially in the hinterland connected to the main arteries. Roads result in development automatically.
• Provision of basic healthcare in rural areas and establishment of tertiary medical facilities in various zones of the country.
• Rehabilitating irrigation schemes as currently agriculture is the backbone of the economy.
• Provision of electricity to major cities so that basic/ cottage industry schemes can be initiated. For that small dams need to constructed and the major dams electricity production enhanced.
• Housing schemes especially for the returning refugees need to be initiated so that skilled manpower is encouraged to returns home especially from the neighboring countries.
• Livestock production is also a very important factor in the rural economy. Animal husbandry units need to be established in various zones of the country to help people raise livestock. Also pastures dedicated to the nomadic population occupied by local warlords be made available for grazing of animals of the nomads.
• PRTs must enhance the quality and impact of their assistance, ensure it is aligned with official national or local priorities and coordinate fully with state institutions.

The lacks of worthwhile reconstruction has spread despondency amongst the Afghans who now see NATO as an occupying force which is not interested in developing their country. This is a dangerous trend and will fuel insurgency further. A stock of the reconstruction strategy needs to be taken and the reconstruction strategy reviewed. It must be acknowledged that the Afghan state institutions are corrupt, inefficient and incompetent. These therefore need to be helped through induction of Afghans from abroad and also provision of qualified staff from NATO countries. A strict check is required to oversee that funds are channelised in the right direction through a well thought out strategy.
The above mentioned measures need to be initiated immediately. All agencies whether government, NGO or the PRT’s need to focus on there. This will give the economy a jump start and improve the life of the poor Afghans. Other projects can then be initiated in the second phase.
Looking at the government, UN or donor countries plans they appear tremendous on paper with high sounding aims and objectives. However there is not much to show on ground. Construction of high rise plazas or buildings does not help the poor and the vulnerable sections of the society.